Flash Gordon Left Me The Keys

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ShOw Me ThE WaY Back to YoUr HeArT'¿'¿'¿

I remember days nights were
never cold
I had you in my life
I had you here to hold
and I remember love warm as a
summer day
but I lost you
and I lost my way
now I’m in the rain
begging you please, please

baby won’t you show me the way
back to your heart
let me see a sign to know if I’m
close or far
lead me back to the road that
leads back to your arms
to your arms

every night another lonely street
I walk down alone
searching for a light
your light to lead me home
leave a candle in the window
and let it shine for me
take my hand and take these
tears away
I can’t take the pain
I’m on my knees, please

baby, won’t you show me the way back
to your heart
let me see a sign to know if I’m close
or far
lead me back to the road that
leads back to your arms
to your arms

take my hand and take me
in your arms
I’m out in the dark
down on my knees, please

show me the way back to
your heart
let me see a sign to know if
I’m close or far
lead me back to the road
that leads back to your arms
to your arms
to your arms

well, i dont know where u are now
that i still miss u
that i still remember u
that i cant forget u
even .....till now....

from 1997 till 2004

i still have u in my heart

Basnight floats an OLF idea

If it floats, is owned by the Navy and jet fighters land on it, it must be an aircraft carrier.

Historically, that has been the case.

However, a floating offshore platform fits the model with aplomb, as well.

So says state Sen. Marc Basnight, D-Dare, Senate president pro tem. He's suggesting such a platform to break the outlying landing field logjam between North Carolina and the Navy.

In a Jan. 23 letter to the state's congressional delegation, Basnight outlines his suggestion:

"I ask that you encourage the Navy to explore what many believe is a legitimate alternative to the current OLF site: building an offshore platform for pilots to practice taking off and landing the Super Hornets. An offshore platform in the Atlantic Ocean, or perhaps in Pamlico Sound, is a viable option that deserves careful review. In fact, this suggestion was raised earlier as a potential alternative to a land-based OLF, but the possibility barely even received a mention in the Navy's final environmental impact statement. ...

"(A)n offshore platform would improve pilot safety by reducing the risk of costly bird collisions and by providing a more realistic practice area. Moreover, it would not cause further economic damage in one of North Carolina's most economically depressed areas. And it would avoid putting local residents in danger of a jet crashing into a home, a school, or another building.

"By contrast, the current OLF site choice would have several extremely harmful effects in Washington County and in nearby Beaufort County. In all my years of public service, I can think of no proposal that has generated more united opposition than this one."

A strategic concept
The Navy is no stranger to offshore platforms. In 1996, the Office of Naval Research began work on Mobile Offshore Bases, or MOBs, yet another acronym to go along with OLF. The Navy even has devoted a Web page to explaining the MOB in voluminous detail, laced with enough technical information to satisfy a scientist.

But both concepts share more than just a three-letter designation.

In January 1998, a Norwegian firm that developed floating oil rigs capable of withstanding the brutal conditions found in the North Sea, published the results of a $6 million feasibility study conducted for the Navy.

"SeaBase has been conceived as the world's largest ever marine structure," states Aker Kvaerner's Web site. "Kvaerner's vision for the huge semi-submersible structure, the largest of its kind in the world, is 1,600 metres long and 140 metres wide, comprising three large-scale semi-submersible platforms, based on concepts derived from Kvaerners world-class experience in the design and construction of large structures for the offshore oil and gas industry. The three platforms are linked by two semi-buoyant flexible bridges. SeaBase will be capable of absorbing the motions of the high seas, and remain operational as a movable military base, even in severe weather. Facilities aboard SeaBase will include a runway capable of landing up to C-17 transport aircraft, and accommodations for up to 10,000 military personnel."

From Navy concept to Kvaerner publication, the idea has created a stir.

"The United States was interested in the idea of having a large mobile floating base that could be relocated anywhere in the world," writes Dr. Ronald Riggs, a University of Hawaii engineering professor. "It could be placed in international waters, where it wouldn't be subjected to other country's national laws, regulations, and restrictions."

Riggs is among a number of engineers who have conducted research for the Navy.

"Dr. Riggs and Dr. Ertekin's research led them to solving fluid and structural dynamics problems that these very long structures would face," states a UH Web page. "Their research for the U.S. Navy helped gain a better understanding of how multi-module structures would respond and behave in waves, which in turn will help engineers design a more intelligent structure."

Riggs' and Ertekin's researched resulted in construction of a large, floating causeway that allows the Navy to off-load materials in areas where there is no shore access, contends the Web site.

"We got good feedback for that particular product," writes Riggs.

In January 2003, Navy engineers published a Web page devoted to MOB research.

A list of other firms and organizations conducting that research and developing technology for the MOB concept reads like a who's who of Department of Defense contractors, including Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Bechtel National. Major universities, including MIT, also are researching the project.

One firm conducting MOB research is well-placed with the Bush administration. Brown and Root, better known as KBR -- a firm alleged to have overcharged DOD for contract work in Iraq -- is a subsidiary of Halliburton. That is the firm from which Vice President Dick Cheney resigned as chief executive officer when he took the number-two slot on the Republican ticket for the 2000 presidential race.

In November 2000, a full-size floating airport moored in Japan's Yokosuka Bay passed muster following the successful completion of 200 test landings, according to Interpool's publication, The Cargo Letter.

Possibly the most interesting offshore landing concept is published on the Navy's engineering Web page. The design is titled "F-18 Offshore Training Platform (Oceana)." Information on the design indicates the structure was to be positioned "20-30 km off the coast of the Virginia Capes." That area, according to Web site GlobalSecurity.org, is a military "surface and subsurface operating area off the Virginia and North Carolina coasts."

Two thumbs up?
The Navy's Web site summarizes with a thumbs-up to MOBs.

"The resulting assessment report was provided to Congress in April 2000. A key conclusion was that all of the key technology issues identified at the inception of the ... program that put MOB beyond the state-of-practice were either resolved or evaluated sufficiently to conclude there were no inherent showstoppers.

"(T)he results are applicable to all large floating platforms. ... At present, we await other assessments and decisions on the utility of MOB to be made by the Secretary of Defense and Congress."

Navy specs show that a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier comes in at 1,092 feet in length, provides a flight deck width of 252 feet, accommodates 85 aircraft and costs $4.5 billion.

By contrast, the Navy's MOB Web site boasts a platform up to 6,500 feet in length and 400 feet in width, in comparison to a projected 8,000-foot runway for the Washington County OLF.

Some of Basnight's staff appear captivated by the notion as well.

"It's an intriguing thought," said Amy Fulk, Basnight's spokeswoman.

Members of Congress knew at the end of the first Gulf war that the U.S. Army's vaunted Patriot missiles had trouble discerning friend from foe and had been shooting down friendly aircraft. A decade later the upgraded PAC-2 and PAC-3 versions were having the same difficulties. It has been widely reported—and now even U.S. officials believe—that during Operation Iraqi Freedom two friendly aircraft, a British Tornado GR4 fighter-bomber on May 22 and a U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet on April 2, were shot down by U.S. Patriot missiles, killing three airmen. In another incident, a U.S. F-16 fighter pilot on May 24 fired on a Patriot missile battery after the aircraft's radar revealed the missile battery was "locked" on the aircraft.

Despite warnings from two respected watchdog groups—the Project on Government Oversight and Global Security—and firsthand observation by a Dallas-Fort Worth CBS team embedded in a Patriot missile unit, the Pentagon can't do anything until it completes another one of its lengthy secret investigations.

As if an internal probe would be effective: Even though the newest version of the Patriot, the PAC-3, ran into problems during testing, air force lieutenant general Ronald Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency, told reporters that problems with the PAC-3 missiles were "minor" and "annoying."

During the first Gulf war, the military claimed an 80 percent effectiveness rate, although a report by the General Accounting Office found that the Patriot hit only 9 percent of the Iraqi Scud missiles that were launched.

Last November, John Pike, who runs the Global Security watchdog group, was surfing around on the army's Fort Bliss website when he stumbled on a confidential "Initial Lessons Learned" report about the Patriot's problems that had been posted by mistake. The army erased the report from its website, but not before Pike posted it on globalsecurity.org. The report tells about a Patriot missile battery in Jordan running into problems with false missile tracks, and adds, "This information was not shared with Patriot units supporting the Marine Expeditionary Force in Kuwait. Had the experience been shared throughout the [area of responsibility] then the problem could have been minimized."

Last February the CBS news team saw for itself the problems a Patriot missile battery was running into. Embedded at Camp Virginia in Kuwait and forbidden by ground rules from reporting about problems at the time, the CBS reporters were inside the tactical operations center when soldiers zeroed in on what looked like an incoming Iraqi missile. Suddenly, an employee of Raytheon, the Patriot's defense contractor, threw open the door to the center and yelled, "Don't shoot! Don't shoot!" The soldiers let out a sigh of relief and told the news crew, "We just came close to shooting down a Navy F-18."

The CBS crew later wrote: "We observed one battalion battle captain writing daily reports about the problem, which he said were being sent to higher command." After witnessing several incidents involving dangerously false reports about Patriot targets, the crew was also present when Battalion Commander Joe Fischetti confronted a Raytheon representative attached to the unit. Fischetti demanded answers. "You guys are supposed to be the geniuses," Fischetti said, according to the CBS crew. "Tell me what's wrong!"

The Army must restructure to more modular, capabilities-based forces to better meet combatant commanders' requirements. The Army will continue to support operational deployments/rotations while assuming more missions as needed for our nation at war. Changing the organizational structure of units must be logically consistent with future force concepts but tempered by the technological capabilities that are reasonably available within the near term.

Since Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker was confirmed in 2003, the Army changed the terms used to describe the components of the Army. Service officials use the term “Current Force” to refer to what used to be the Legacy and Interim Forces, while “Objective Force” has been replaced by “Future Force.”

On January 28, 2004, Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, briefed the House Armed Services Committee on plans to restructure the Army's current organization. The service will retain the 10 division headquarters as battle command headquarters but move some enabling resources – such as air defense, signal and intelligence – to the brigade level. The Army would also increase the number of brigades under those divisions from three maneuver brigades to four. That alone would take the service from 30 brigades under the division structure to 40. Growing the fourth includes taking much of the division-level support elements -- such as engineers, military intelligence, supply and maintenance units -- and making them organic to the brigade structure.

The Army will continue to support operational deployments/rotations while assuming more missions as needed support national war aims. Changing the organizational structure of units must be logically consistent with future force concepts but tempered by the technological capabilities that are reasonably available within the near term.

To accomplish this, brigade combat teams will be restructured into Brigade Units of Action. Once transitioned, BUAs will enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive and sustained employment to support combatant commanders. BUAs will also enhance the expeditionary and campaign qualities of Army forces by better enabling Joint/coalition operations. The transition to BUAs will also increase the brigade-equivalent forces available to meet both enduring and emerging mission requirements.

This is an Army initiative, and Training and Doctrine Command has the long-term mission. TRADOC was given the responsibility of focusing on Modularity, which is one of Schoomaker’s 16 focus areas. Modularity would give smaller units a degree of flexibility and more power. Previously, whenever there was a change to be made in the Army it would be handed to TRADOC to do an analysis and within a few years come up with and execute a plan. The constraint placed on the TRADOC design effort is that the redesigned division cannot have additional soldiers. To oversee TRADOC's design and development of the future force for the Army, a Futures Center will stand up, realigning functions and resources from the headquarters staff and from the Objective Force Task Force.

The restructuring would leave a division with three types of brigades: heavy, with armor; light, with motorized infantry, and airborne.

The 3rd Infantry Division, based at Fort Stewart, Ga., moved to four brigades as the Army’s modularity test bed shortly after it returned from Iraq in 2003. Their task was initially to turn their three brigades into five rapidly deployable “brigade units of action” that are able to plug into any division and independently fight a high intensity conflict. The proposal would cause the division to get larger by about 2,000 to 3,000 troops. The brigade numbers would stay the same, but combat troops would decrease by about 10 to 15 percent.

The 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky., commanded by Maj.Gen. David Petraeus, has the mission of reorganizing next. By early 2004 the 101st Abn. Div. had officially begun to redeploy their more than 18,000 troops after serving in operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Army plans to stand up an additional two division brigades within a year and grow from 33 active-duty brigade combat teams to 48 by 2007.

The plan includes for the National Guard to grow from 15 enhanced separate brigades to 22 in the same period.

The restructure effort means a need for more infantrymen than the current Army force structure allows, about 3,000-4,000 more per division on the active-duty side

The reorganization also called for the conversion of some 39 field artillery battalions into military police, civil affairs and light infantry units.

The Army will disband 10 air defense artillery battalions. Many of these positions will migrate down to each brigade’s reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition unit.

In Army aviation, the Army plans to create four aviation brigades as part of the restructure effort. Each of those brigades will include two attack battalions with 24 Apache helicopters each, a battalion of 30 Black Hawk helicopters, an unmanned aerial vehicle section and organic maintenance company.

Command-and-control headquarters will be designed as rapidly deployable modules. The division headquarters today – in order to deploy – must pull support from its signal battalion up to division headquarters, pull a lot of intelligence out of its intelligence battalion, pull fires out of the division artillery, pull engineers, and form a larger entity. This makes no sense in the environment we expect to fight in in the future. The division headquarters will be stand-alone entities; they will not rely on subordinate or higher headquarters for manning. The headquarters will be formed and trained as a deployable entity. It will have four command posts in that division headquarters, a homestation operations center that will remain at home, and it will rely on reachback to support the forward-deployed piece of the division. The Army will send two headquarters forward; one will be Joint forces land component-capable in a division. And if the Army is successful in this endeavor, we will have a Joint cell in that headquarters full-time and robust enough to support combat operations in peacetime.

One element is to make every soldier a rifleman. The support troops in the new brigades will have to be more versatile as soldiers. Where under the current structure troops have completed basic training then gone immediately into their specialized fields of logistics, etc., the new structure will require a higher level of combat proficiency from each soldier. This draws on the traditions of the Marine Corps, where every soldier is an Infantryman first, and on Schoomaker's own experience in the Special Forces, where every member of a 12-man "A" team is a special operator first, and a communications expert or medic second.

The reorganization also aims to increase stability within units, which translates to greater stability in Soldiers’ families. Schoomaker said “It’s time we stopped reassigning Soldiers just because they’ve been somewhere for three years. I want to keep Soldiers together – train them cohesively, deploy them as teams and bring them home as teams,” Schoomaker said. “With less frequent turnover, units can build a foundation of experience as long as there is professional development. Investing in leadership training equates to investing in the unit.”